INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2007, Chief Justice John Roberts released his 2006 annual report on the state of the federal judiciary. In the report, he claimed that inadequate judicial salaries were precipitating a "constitutional crisis." 1 According to the Chief Justice, the pay gap between federal judges and their counterparts in the private sector was becoming so large that serving on the judiciary was no longer a reasonable option for many highly qualified lawyers. In his 2005 report, the Chief Justice warned that if the pay gap remained too large, the judiciary will over time cease to be made up of a diverse group of the Nation's very best lawyers. Instead, it will come to be staffed by a combination of the independently wealthy and those following a career path before becoming a judge different from the practicing bar at large. Such a development would dramatically alter the nature of the federal judiciary. 2 The Chief Justice's statements -endorsed by prominent law school deans, 3 the American Bar Association, 4 and leading members of the corporate bar 5 -were correct, at least insofar as they accurately described the large (and growing) pay differential between federal judges and private sector lawyers. In 2005, for example, the average partner in a prominent Chicago-based law [Vol. 88:63 firm earned $2.12 million. 6 By comparison, the judges of the Seventh Circuit, also based in Chicago, earned $171, 800. 7 What is less clear, however, is whether the Chief Justice is correct in concluding that this pay gap will "alter the nature of the federal judiciary." Certainly, Chief Justice Roberts's instinct could very well be right: salary differences might influence who will be willing to join the federal judiciary. Perhaps if judicial pay is relatively low, fewer people will accept the job without accumulating a substantial nest egg beforehand, and some people with college-age children might decline the judgeship altogether. But the fact that some persons may no longer want to serve as federal judges because of pay concerns does not mean that the nature of the federal judiciary will thereby be fundamentally altered. The critical question is not whether judicial salaries affect composition -they might -but whether any resulting change in composition affects the "nature" of the federal judiciary, that is to say, whether relatively low judicial salaries affect the "product" the circuit courts produce.
This Article is the first to test the impact of judicial pay on performance of federal circuit judges. By comparing judicial salaries to salaries of the next best financial opportunity for most circuit judges -partnership in regional law firms -this Article finds that judicial compensation is irrelevant to most quantifiable measures of judicial performance. Regardless of the difference between their salary and their next best opportunity, judges of both political parties vote the same in controversial cases; they are equally likely to cite as persuasive authority opinions by judges from the other political party; they decide controversial cases in the same amount of time; and they write equally strong opinions. 8 Indeed, the only statistically significant effect of low judicial salaries is that judges paid poorly as against their next best opportunity dissent less often in controversial cases. But the magnitude of this effect is tiny. In short, pretty much nothing would happen if Congress decided to raise judicial salaries.
These empirical results make sense. There are very few federal circuit judgeships, and many people want them. Salary, a generous pension, and a number of non-pecuniary perks make the federal circuit judgeship attractive. The president picks his nominee based on his preferences in combination with the views of the senators. The composition and depth of the candidate pool makes little difference. True, someone might turn down the job for financial reasons, but the next person picked will be indistinguishable in his or her eventual judicial performance. 6 The AmLaw 100, 2006 , AM. LAW., May 2006 , at 165 (reporting 2005 profits per partner at Kirkland & Ellis). 7 The office of the U.S. Courts provided data on the salaries for federal circuit judges. SALARIES OF FEDERAL JUDGES, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, AND CHIEF JUSTICE SINCE 1968 1 (2007 , http://www.uscourts.gov/salarychart.pdf [hereinafter SALARY DATA] . 8 The opinion results border on statistically significant, but the magnitude of the effect is small. Part I.A sets forth the constitutional structure, statutory scheme, and history of the law governing judicial salaries. Part I.B summarizes the debate about judicial salaries, considering the arguments made for higher salaries. Based on these arguments, Part I.B articulates competing theories about the likely impact of judicial pay on judicial performance. Part II details the statistical methodology used to test the theories. It develops two approaches -judge-tojudge direct comparisons and pool-to-pool comparisons -that can be used to determine whether higher salaries would alter judicial performance. Part III performs the statistical analysis, reporting that judicial pay does not affect the nature of judicial votes in controversial cases, the speed of case disposition in controversial cases, the character of judicial citations in written opinions, or the strength of judicial opinions. Part III does show that judges who give up a lot of money to take the bench dissent less frequently. By inference, then, low judicial pay (i.e., big spreads between judicial pay and private sector pay) yields marginally less dissent. Part IV deals with some potential objections to the analysis, and, finally, there is a brief conclusion.
I. JUDICIAL SALARIES: BACKGROUND AND THEORIES

A. Constitutional Requirements and Statutory Background
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." 9 The framers wanted to insulate judges from the whims of the legislative branch and, thus, ensure a more independent judiciary. 10 Yet, the framers did not account for inflation. The text of the Constitution prevents Congress from reducing judicial salaries, but it does not require cost of living increases. Without such increases, inflation diminishes the purchasing power of the judicial salary. As 9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1900). Hamilton writes:
In a monarchy [fixed judicial salaries] is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws. Id. at 483; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1900) (reflecting on the judicial compensation clause and stating " [i] n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will"). [Vol. 88:63 many have noted, that is exactly what has happened over the last thirty yearsthe real salary for federal judges has declined. 11 Congress has tackled the problem of judicial salaries a number of times. In 1967, Congress enacted the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act. 12 This Act established a commission to review the salary structure of high-level members of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 13 The commission recommended a salary package to the president and the president then decided on salaries, which took effect unless Congress expressly rejected the proposed salary structure. 14 This Act resulted in a large judicial pay increase in its first year, but had little effect on salaries thereafter. 15 In 1975, Congress made its next foray into judicial salaries. The Executive Salary Cost of Living Adjustment Act provided for automatic cost of living adjustments (COLAs) for members of Congress, the executive, and the judiciary. 16 Despite efforts under this Act to make wage adjustments predictable and consistent, Congress often rejected the automatic COLA increases for itself and the other branches. 17 This rejection -coupled with the rampant inflation of the late seventies -meant that inflation-adjusted judicial salaries fell almost thirty percent during this period. 18 In 1980, a group of federal district court judges, frustrated with the decline in real salaries, filed a lawsuit claiming that Congress violated the constitutional guarantee of undiminished judicial salaries by postponing or repealing previously-enacted automatic COLA adjustments. In United States 11 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 21-34 (2d ed. 1996) (illustrating the decline in the real value of judicial salaries); Kristen A. Holt, Justice for Judges: The Roadblocks on the Path to Judicial Compensation Reform, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 513, 515 (2006) ("Inflation has decreased judges' purchasing power and ability to maintain a constant standard of living."); Albert Yoon, Love 's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945 -2000 , 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029 , 1033 fig.1 (2003 .
12 Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613, 642-45 (1967) v. Will, 19 the Supreme Court responded by reinstating the COLA increases for two of the four years the judges requested. 20 In picking among the COLA increases, the Court distinguished between COLAs that had vested and those that had not. The Court held that "a salary increase 'vests' for purposes of the Compensation Clause only when it takes effect as part of the compensation due and payable to Article III judges." 21 The upshot of Will is that Congress cannot repeal COLA increases after the judges have received them. Congress, however, can repeal a COLA increase that is simply promised, if money has yet to be distributed under that adjustment.
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 marks the most recent Congressional activity on judicial salaries. 22 The Act accomplished three things. First, it standardized the COLA adjustment, tying the inflation adjustment in judicial salary to the adjustment regularly given other federal government employees. 23 Second, the Act fused any Congressional decision about COLA increases for judges with the decision about COLA increases for members of Congress and high-level executive branch officials. 24 If Congress approved a COLA increase for the judiciary, it would necessarily approve a COLA increase for itself and executive officials. This tying froze judicial salaries because members of Congress feared voter backlash if they gave themselves a raise. 25 Third, and unrelated to the issue of COLAs, the Act gave an immediate forty percent judicial pay bump. 26 At the same time, the Act restricted how much judges could earn from non-judicial activities. 27 The Act capped the payment for teaching-style services at fifteen percent of the judicial salary. 28 Coupled with the ethical restriction on extra-judicial activities, like serving on corporate boards, the cap effectively ensures that federal judges' income will be limited to their official salary plus some income from teaching.
B. The Salary Debate
Most sitting federal judges find the current salary system deplorable. 29 Like every other worker, judges want higher wages, at least enough additional cash 19 449 U. S. 200 (1980) . 20 Id. at 230. 21 Id. at 229. 22 Pub. L. No. 101-194 § § 702-705, 103 Stat. 1717 , 1767 -71 (1989 The first argument involves retention. Declining real salaries will result in judges leaving the bench. 30 Turnover might affect judicial performance because the exit of a sitting judge creates transition costs. The vacancy has to be filled and the new judge brought up to speed. Until that happens, the other judges carry a heavier workload, straining the circuit court's capacity. 31 In addition, high turnover is thought to hamper judicial independence. 32 Knowing that they will eventually be leaving the bench, judges might be reluctant to rule against the interests of potential future employers. 33 This argument assumes that declining inflation-adjusted judicial salaries leads to higher turnover. Yet that does not appear to be the case. Albert Yoon examined the retirement decisions of all district court and federal circuit judges between 1945 and 2000 and found that "tenure trends among the federal judiciary have held fairly constant over the past half century, notwithstanding the cyclical decline in inflation-adjusted salaries." 34 The second argument for higher salaries rests on attracting lawyers from the private bar and maintaining a diversity of backgrounds on the federal bench. 35 Private-sector lawyers give up a lot to join the bench. Few talented lawyers in private practice, the argument goes, will make the leap if judicial salaries remain far below those in the private sector. This argument assumes that 33 Fed. Judicial Compensation, Justice Alito's testimony, supra note 2, at 3; Letter from Corporate Counsels, supra note 5, at 2; Letter from Law School Deans, supra note 3, at 1. attracting private-sector lawyers will make the judiciary better in some meaningful sense. 36 These lawyers might decide cases with a greater understanding and appreciation of the real world consequences of their decisions or have greater expertise in certain technical subjects like, say, securities law. 37 Empirically testing this particular argument is hard, and this Article does not aim to do so. This Article does find, however, that holding constant the net cost of taking a judgeship, lawyers who come directly from private practice perform similarly to those coming from government jobs, other judgeships, or academia across a range of judicial performance measures. 38 The third argument for higher salaries is that higher judicial salaries lead to higher quality judges. 39 A circuit judgeship brings with it substantial nonpecuniary benefits and a generous pension. 40 The job offers prestige, power, influence, control of one's schedule, and interesting work. It is not hard to find lawyers willing to take circuit judgeships because the actual wage is only onearguably small -component of the total compensation package. The intuition is that lower pay might lead to "worse" judges, not zero judges. 41 The next subsection develops this intuition in detail, before Section III takes the intuition to the data. 36 See Letter from Corporate Counsels, supra note 5, at 2. 37 Prior experience diversity is also a concern among senators. 39 See Fed. Judicial Compensation, Justice Breyer's testimony, supra note 2, at 9; Judicial Security and Independence, Justice Kennedy's testimony, supra note 2, at 9; ABA testimony, supra note 4, at 2; 2006 report, supra note 1, at 2; Letter from Corporate Counsels, supra note 5, at 2. 40 As a pension benefit, federal judges draw their existing salary and health benefits until they die. 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) . The so-called "rule of 80" determines eligibility. The pension vests if the judge is at least sixty-five years old and has at least ten years of service, so long as the judge's age and service sum to eighty. Id. § 371(c). For a detailed discussion of the history of federal judicial pensions, see Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869 -2002 , 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 146-48 (2006 . 41 As Ann Althouse wrote for the New York Times: If the pay is low, the judges will be the kind of people who don't care that much about money. They might be monkish scholars, or they might be ideologues who see in the law whatever it is they think is good for us. . . . Low judicial pay should trouble us not because the judges will somehow lack 'excellence.' It should trouble us because the law will be articulated by ideologues and recluses. Ann Althouse, An Awkward Plea, N.Y. TIMES, February 17, 2007, at A1.
The Salary Matters Theory
The familiar economic argument is that higher wages attract better workers. In other words, workers with the greatest skill or human capital command the highest wages. 42 This argument does not readily transfer to the pool of federal circuit judicial nominees. Almost every nominee for a judgeship takes a pay cut for the bench. Even nominees that come from the public sector could, if they wanted to, work in law firms, which would pay more than a circuit judgeship. The real impact of higher judicial salaries is a reduction of the pay cut nominees have to take. As we shall see, reducing the size of the pay cut could theoretically affect the judiciary's performance.
People care about both non-pecuniary and pecuniary aspects of a job. 43 For any person, a preference profile can be constructed indicating how much he or she subjectively values each non-pecuniary aspect and each pecuniary aspect of a given job. This profile will differ for each person depending on the individual's wealth, how much he or she values consumption versus leisure, and many other personal factors. Now take judges. Judges care about a number of things besides money: status, prestige, leisure, power to affect policy, and public service. 44 Different people attach different weights to these non-pecuniary aspects of the job. The spread between the judicial salary and the wage in a candidate's next best opportunity reveals the strength of the candidate's attachment to the nonpecuniary aspects of judging. In other words, the spread reflects the person's taste for becoming a judge; a candidate willing to accept a large spread has a strong preference for judging. 45 ECON. 281 (1958) . 43 For survey results reporting the relationship between job satisfaction and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of a job, see Daniel S. Hamermesh, The Changing Distribution of Job Satisfaction, 36 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 26 (2001) (examining the effect of earnings inequality on job satisfaction and concluding that because the "nonpecuniary and nonwage pecuniary returns to work is income-elastic . . . it would be very worthwhile to examine a broader set of economic determinants of satisfaction"), and David S. Hamermesh, Changing Inequality in the Markets for Workplace Amenities, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1085 ECON. , 1085 ECON. -86 (1999 (investigating the possibility that "rising wage inequality has been partly offset by a negatively correlated reduction of the nonpecuniary returns to work"). 44 the various non-pecuniary aspects of a judgeship might then influence eventual judicial performance. A strong desire for the circuit judgeship could, for example, correlate with a strong preference for leisure, which might manifest itself by that judge taking a long time to write her opinions.
By raising salaries, Congress reduces the spread between judicial salaries and the candidate's next best opportunity. As a result, higher salaries might weed out some of the people with the strongest desires for the judicial role. Sure, the true ideologue, the leisure maximizer, the prestige-obsessed, and the committed public servant will still be interested in the judgeship, but now so will a lot of other people. Under the "salary matters" theory, increased competition affects the kind of person eventually selected for the bench.
To see why this might be so, suppose that the pay for circuit judges is zero. In this case, individuals willing to take the job must really want to be judges. These individuals value non-pecuniary aspects of the job a lot -leisure, power, prestige, public service, etc. -and money less so (perhaps because they are wealthy already). Suppose the pay is increased to $150,000 a year. In that case, people who would take the judgeship for nothing would still compete for the judicial slot, but now people who place a lower value on non-pecuniary perks and a higher value on wages would enter the pool. Increasing pay to $2 million a year expands the pool even further; it now includes some lawyers who do not care much about the non-pecuniary aspects of the judgeship and care a lot about money. In this way, raising judicial pay (1) expands the candidate pool and (2) alters the profile of "tastes" for the judicial role among pool members.
From this theory, one testable implication is that changes in judicial pay affect judicial performance. Holding all else equal, with a high spread between judicial pay and the next best opportunity, the judiciary will be composed of people who are more partisan, lazier, more driven by prestige, and/or place a higher value on public service. These judges will act like it by, for instance, voting more consistently along party lines (the partisan judge), only citing judges from the same political party (the partisan judge), writing opinions more slowly (the lazy judge), or investing more time writing decisions other judges will cite (the prestige-motivated judge).
Upon closer inspection, then, there is some substance to the proponent's claim that higher judicial salaries will attract better-quality judges. 46 Once unpacked, some possible effects of higher judicial salaries do, in fact, point in the direction of a higher-quality judiciary: higher salaries might lead to a harder working judiciary. Counter-intuitively, other possible effects of higher Morally Satisfying Employment, 50 AM. ECON. 21, 27-29 (2006) (finding that economists working for non-profits make thirty-eight percent less than their counterparts in for-profit firms and attributing this compensation differential to the non-pecuniary benefit of working in a morally satisfying industry). 46 For Supreme Court Justices making this claim, see sources cited supra note 2; for commentary, see sources cited supra notes 3-5.
judicial salary point in the direction of a lower-quality judiciary: higher salaries might lead to the appointment of judges less committed to public service or less concerned with their own judicial influence. Still other effects of higher judicial salaries are ambiguous. For example, it depends on one's normative view whether a more partisan judiciary is good or bad. 47 But all this is just theory. Section III tests whether any of these effects are present in the data.
The Substitutes Theory
There is an alternative theory about the impact of raising judicial salaries. Suppose political tides select the same kind of people for judgeships regardless how the candidate pool is composed. In this case, deepening the pool to include people who care more about salary does not make sense. The judiciary will have the same number of leisure maximizers, ideologues, influencepeddlers, and committed public-servants, independent of the wage. The spread between judicial pay and a candidate's next best opportunity does not make a difference. For reasons that will become clear, I denote this alternative theory the substitutes theory.
For the substitutes theory to be true, two conditions must hold: (1) politics alone must drive judicial selections; and, (2) the pool, at present and historic salary levels, must be saturated with candidates who are near-perfect substitutes for those people unwilling to take the job because of salary concerns. By near-perfect substitutes, I mean the candidates in the pool are the same in terms of their ability to be confirmed, their appeal to the president, and their anticipated judicial performance. Under these conditions, expanding the pool does not change the type of person who reaches the bench. The president has his man or woman picked out already. If that person declines because of salary concerns to join the bench, the next person selected will be indistinguishable in her judicial performance. Because the number of interchangeable candidates is so large, odds are one of them will take the job at the prevailing wage.
In other words, even if low salaries reduce the number of candidates willing to take the circuit judgeship, that reduction might be inconsequential. It depends on the relationship between the number of comparable remaining candidates and the number of appointment slots. Reducing the pool, for instance, from 500 identical candidates to 250 identical candidates is immaterial if the president only appoints ten judges. This insight is the thrust of the substitutes theory.
II. TWO STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF HIGHER JUDICIAL SALARIES
To unravel which of the two theories is true requires an inquiry into whether judicial pay affects judicial performance. If judicial pay does not impact performance, the data support the substitutes theory. If judicial pay does impact performance, the data support the salary matters theory. But such an analysis presupposes that it is possible to determine the relationship between judicial pay and judicial performance. 48 On this score, the standard economic methodology is not much help.
Labor economists, for example, interested in measuring the impact of higher salaries typically compare two sets of workers. The first set of workers is paid more than the second set of roughly similar workers. Higher pay is said to have an effect if the high-paid workers produce more or quit less often than the low-paid workers. 49 For federal circuit judges, such an approach is not feasible. All federal circuit judges make roughly the same judicial salary. As a result, one cannot just compare judges with high salaries to judges with low salaries. To get around this problem, notice that judges are not equally well-paid as against their next best opportunity. The spread between private sector salaries and judicial salaries differs dramatically across time and across regions. I exploit 48 The literature studying the link between judicial pay and the performance of the federal circuit courts is scant. this variation to conduct the statistical analysis. To detail this methodology further, consider two approaches to assessing the impact of judicial salaries: direct comparison and pool comparison.
A. Direct Comparison Approach
The direct comparison approach asks whether people who give up more money to become judges simply want the job more than people who give up less money. The strong preference for the judgeship translates into: (1) a stronger desire to impose policy preferences (revealed by, for example, more partisan voting and citation practices); 50 (2) a stronger desire for leisure (revealed by, for example, taking longer to file published decisions and by dissenting less frequently); 51 and/or, (3) a stronger desire to exert judicial influence (revealed by drafting opinions that garner more citations). 52 All this, of course, must also control for the initial amount of wealth a candidate possesses. No matter the strength of their "taste" for the judgeship, wealthy candidates can more easily afford a pay cut than non-wealthy candidates. For precisely this reason, the empirical analysis controls for wealth of the candidate at the time of appointment.
Comparing the spread between judicial salary and a judge's next best opportunity is the foundation of the statistical analysis. A judicial pay raise reduces the financial sacrifice every judge must make to take the bench. One way to assess the effect of a reduced sacrifice is to compare behavior of judges who actually made big financial sacrifices with behavior of judges who made small financial sacrifices. If, on the one hand, the two sets of judges behave similarly, judicial performance is independent of the financial sacrifice made. Congress, then, might as well leave judicial salaries where they are; the resulting increase in every future nominee's financial sacrifice should not affect judicial performance. If, on the other hand, the two sets of judges behave differently, judicial performance does depend on the level of financial sacrifice and, accordingly, reducing the required financial sacrifice should alter the circuit courts' functioning.
One limitation of this analysis is that I don't (and can't!) observe the judicial behavior of people who actually turned down the judgeship for financial reasons. The great, productive New York City lawyer who would have taken the judgeship if it paid $1,000,000 is not in the sample. I do, however, have a clue as to how that lawyer would have acted on the bench. Suppose that Congress decided to "match" judicial salaries with private sector salaries, to pay the New York City lawyer one million dollars a year. Now that lawyer would sacrifice nothing for the judgeship. Judges in my sample who actually did give up close to nothing for the bench may be good proxies for candidates like this one who, with a substantial judicial pay raise, would enter the pool. If so, examination of the former's behavior can be used to predict the likely performance of the latter.
The opportunity cost for a federal judicial nominee is her forgone wages from her next best employment opportunity. I construct this measure for 259 federal circuit judges appointed between 1974 and 2004. For a lawyer of the candidate's age, law firm salaries in the region at the date of confirmation serve as the relevant benchmark. 53 Of course, many judges come from academia, government positions, and other judgeships. For these judges, any lost salary at the time of appointment is small; 54 their current salaries and federal circuit judges' salaries do not differ that much. I nevertheless use lost law firm wages as the relevant opportunity cost. 55 53 For this project, the best available law firm salary data comes from publications by Altman Weil, a law firm consulting firm. See generally ALTMAN WEIL PUBLICATIONS, INC., THE SURVEY OF LAW FIRM ECONOMICS (2005) [hereinafter ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY]. Data from previous years comes from prior editions of the survey. For reasons described infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, the other leading sources of law firm salary information, the AmLaw100 and AmLaw200 lists of profits per partner, do not provide a good measure of the salary judges forgo by taking the judgeship. Altman Weil's survey reflects self-reports by law firms throughout the country. In 2005, for example, the survey includes 7,516 associates and 9,704 partners, working in 340 U.S. law firms. ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY, supra, at 5. Altman Weil sends the survey to law firms that have contact with the company, specifically firms that have purchased their consulting services, subscribe to their newsletter, or participated in the survey's prior editions. Id. at 11.
I measure the judge's next best financial option as working for a law firm in their region. The assumption rules out the possibility that a judge's next best financial option is a higher paying law firm in a totally different regional market. The regional restriction makes sense for most judges in the sample. Of the 259 judges, 240 judges remained in the same region for the ten years before taking the bench. See infra text accompanying notes 56-62 (describing the methodology used to construct each judge's opportunity cost). 54 Compare SALARY DATA, supra note 7, at 1-2 (providing salary information on federal district court judges), and NAT'L CTR. FOR 55 This assumes that any government lawyer, judge, or academic considered for a circuit court judgeship is talented enough to be a law firm partner -if they so choose -at an average firm in their region. The evidence supports this assumption. Prosecutors move into law firms. See Boylan, supra note 54, at 383 ("Of the 570 [assistant] U.S. attorneys in the study . . . 19.65% took a position in a large private practice, and 39.12% took a position in a I then control for prior experience to account for systematic differences in lawyers coming from government service, prior judgeships, or academia because the very fact that these judges come from places other than private practice might reveal something about their eventual judicial behavior. Government lawyers, lower-court judges, and academics might, for instance, prefer leisure more than private sector lawyers. And so, holding opportunity cost constant, a judge coming from one of these positions might write opinions less swiftly than a judge coming straight from the private bar. The dummy variables for prior experience capture these potential differences.
The lost wages calculation for a person considering the bench consists of eight steps. First, calculate, at the time of the appointment, the number of years the candidate would likely remain at the law firm if they did not take the judgeship. Second, determine the likely law firm compensation for each of those years, considering increasing compensation due to increased seniority in the firm. Third, estimate how much law firm compensation in general is likely to increase during that time. Fourth, discount the total amount back to present value using the real discount rate. 56 Fifth, estimate the anticipated judicial wage for the number of years of expected service on the bench and discount this amount back to present value. Sixth, to get the net cost of taking the judgeship -the financial sacrifice made -subtract the present value of the anticipated judicial salary from the present value of the lost law firm wages. Seventh, adjust this net sacrifice for geographic cost of living differences, revealing, in effect, the purchasing power of the wages forgone. Finally, place that lost purchasing power into constant dollars, enabling the comparison of the financial sacrifices made by judges appointed at different times.
To illustrate more explicitly, consider a specific example. Judge James Sprouse was appointed and confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1979. Judge Sprouse was 56 at the time of his confirmation, small private practice."). State court judges rely on contacts to secure positions in local firms. See Jonathan P. Nase, Why Judges Leave the Bench: Pennsylvania 1978 -1993 , 68 TEMP. L. REV. 739, 752 (1995 REV. 847, 852 (1985) ("The goal of personal injury litigation is to award plaintiffs . . . their lost earnings. The court calculates the present value of future lost earnings by forecasting future lost earnings and then discounting the present value.").
had graduated law school in 1949, and was likely admitted to the bar in 1950. 57 According to the 1979 edition of the Altman Weil survey, a lawyer who graduated law school the same year as Judge Sprouse and who worked at a firm in the South Atlantic region -encompassing West Virginia, where Judge Sprouse located his chambers -earned $97,578 that year. 58 That amount gives one year of lost wages; to calculate Judge Sprouse's aggregate forgone wages requires adding to $97,578 the amount a lawyer with one more year of seniority at a firm in the same region made that same year ($113,557) , and adding the amount a lawyer with two more years seniority would have made in the same year, and so on, until the salary of the lawyer with eight more years of seniority is included. The result is a stream of nine years worth of lost salary, based on the assumptions that: (1) had he not become a judge, Judge Sprouse would have retired from the practice of law at the age of sixty-five; and, (2) Judge Sprouse's law firm salary would have increased in accordance with the general increase in law firm salary as the lawyer ages in that region. Discounting this sum back to present value using a real interest rate of three percent arrives at total forgone wages of $868,319.56. 59 Next, consider Judge Sprouse's judicial salary. In 1979, a circuit judge made $65,000 a year. To get the present value of the estimated income stream from the judicial salary, this figure should be multiplied by the nine years until expected retirement and then discounted to present value. 60 523, 548 (1983) (holding that discounting with a real rate of interest of between one and three percent is appropriate for computing lost earnings). I did the same analysis with discount rates ranging from 1 to 6 percent. The statistical results all still hold. Note that inflation is not included in the growth rate of the law firm wages. As such, the real rate of interest is used to discount back to present value. This approach thus treats inflation the same in the numerator and denominator of the lost earnings equation. See O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199-1201 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (holding the calculation of a plaintiff's lost earnings was not unreasonable after computations using this method). 60 Nominal judicial wages have, of course, increased over time, from $42,500 in 1974 to $175,100 in 2006. Inflationary pressures drove much of this judicial wage growth, albeit not enough to make the judicial wage constant in real terms. As with lost law firm salaries, in computing the present value of the judicial wage, I did not bump the wage up to account for inflationary increases. At the same time, the real, not nominal, discount rate is used. The treatment of inflation is thus the same in the numerator and the denominator of the judicial salary computation.
living differences 61 and inflation, 62 Judge Sprouse gave up $949,120.79 in 2004 dollars to take the bench. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the net cost measure: The descriptive statistics reveal a few under-appreciated points in the judicial salary debate. First, the debate focuses on a comparison of annual judicial salary versus annual salary in private firms or academia, with a focus on the large and ever-increasing first year associate salaries in major markets. 63 61 The ACCRA index is used to account for geographic cost of living differences. This index is commonly used for comparing relative cost of living across the country. See, e.g Jan. 11, 2008) . For a precise description of the ACCRA data used in the statistical analysis see the data collection memo, available at http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/default.aspx (follow "Baker, Scott A." hyperlink).
62 Inflation adjustments use the annual consumer price index (CPI); the data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost (last visited July 21, 2007).
63 Fed. Judicial Compensation, Justice Breyer's testimony, supra note 2, at 3-4 ; Judicial Security and Independence, Justice Kennedy's testimony, supra note 2, at 10-11; Letter from Corporate Counsels, supra note 5, at 2.
There is a shock value to this focus. In 2006, including year end bonus, first year associates at major New York City law firms made as much or more than circuit court judges. 64 How could a judge be valued the same as a first year associate? 65 But, for a person considering the bench, this annual comparison is immaterial because it ignores differences in cost of living. Judicial salaries do not vary by location; law firm salaries generally do. 66 Comparing judicial pay for a judge sitting in, say, Omaha, Nebraska with law firm salaries in Washington, D.C. or New York City misses the point that a dollar buys a lot more in Omaha.
Second, because few circuit judges ever leave the bench, use of an annual comparison also hides differences in lost lifetime earnings -the true wages forgone. 67 Judges appointed early in life had the highest net cost of taking a judgeship. The four judges who made the biggest sacrifice -Judges William Pryor, Jerry Smith, Lavenski Smith, and Karen Henderson -were all appointed in their early or mid-forties. The extra years of earnings they lost swamp differences in geographic cost of living and differences in law firm salaries.
Third, the net cost of taking the bench has not increased substantially since 1974. There is a lot of variation across judges, but only a small upward trend over time. 68 Although law firm salaries have increased in real terms, the age of appointment has bounced around. President Ronald Reagan appointed relatively young federal judges (average age 49). 69 President George W. Bush appointed some older judges and some younger judges (average age 52). 70 Comparing the two sets on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, shows that some Ronald Reagan appointees sacrificed more purchasing power than some George W. 68 The correlation between year of appointment and net cost is 0.12. 69 The average age figures can be easily derived from the dataset for this project, which is available at http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/default.aspx (follow "Baker, Scott A." hyperlink). 70 Id. 71 Compare, for example, the Reagan-appointee Judge Greenberg with the George W. Bush appointee Judge M. Fisher. The data memo contains a complete listing of the net cost data and is available at http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/default.aspx (follow "Baker, Scott A." hyperlink).
The data appear to undermine the notion -implicit in the arguments by proponents of higher salaries -that appointees from ten or twenty years ago paid a small price to take the bench, whereas appointees today pay a hefty price. 72 The truth is that lost purchasing power depends on the judge's age and her geographic cost of living, not just the absolute salary in the private sector. Every judge appointed before the age of forty-five took a serious financial hit in taking the bench. Again, annual comparisons to the salaries of lawyers in large market mega-firms, law school professors or law school deans are not revealing. If low judicial salaries are a problem now, they probably always were a problem.
B. Pool Comparison Approach
The direct comparison approach only looks at those candidates nominated and confirmed to the bench and thus does not capture the strength of the candidate pool from which the president selects. A common argument for higher judicial salaries is that an increase would deepen the candidate pool. 73 With higher judicial salaries, financial considerations would no longer deter some candidates from considering the judgeship. The deeper pool would provide more people from which the president could choose. Indeed, under the salary matters theory, higher judicial salaries can make the pool better as well as larger, by luring people with tempered preferences for the judicial role into the candidate pool. Any analysis of the impact of judicial salaries must therefore compare the strength of the pools the nominees come from as well as the strength of individual nominees. If nominees from small candidate pools are "worse" judges than nominees from large candidate pools, then Congress buys something with higher judicial salaries.
Pool comparisons require a measure of pool strength. For each judge, the net cost for the typical 49-year-old lawyer in the judge's region at the time of the judge's appointment proxies the strength of the pool from which that judge came. 74 To wade into the candidate pool, this typical lawyer would have to give up sixteen years of law firm income, adjusted for increased seniority in the firm. As in the direct comparison, the discounted value of the judicial wage is deducted from the present value of the lost law firm wages. The net cost figure is then adjusted for geographic cost of living differences and inflation. The result is a measure of the "typical" loss in purchasing power for a lawyer who decided to take a judicial appointment at that time in that region. 75 75 The D.C. Circuit judges are not included in the pool comparisons. Since the president selects these judges from the national market, there is not a natural regional pool. As such, power, forgone income should be a relatively small barrier to entry into the judicial nomination process and, as a result, the candidate pool should be quite deep. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the net costs for the various circuit pools from which the presidents selected. This section tests three hypotheses concerning the relationship between higher judicial salaries and judicial performance. Drawn from the salary matters theory, the three hypotheses are: (1) paying circuit judges more creates a less ideological judiciary; (2) paying circuit judges more creates a harder it was hard to decide the relevant region that a "typical" D.C. circuit judge might come from. In addition, the president looks to specific states for the regional circuit appointments. See Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Court Appointments Conundrum, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 743, 768 (stating that senators "must cooperate with the presidents . . . on important matters, such as whether the senate will continue to honor traditions that hold that appeals court judges should be residents of the states in which positions open, and should have chambers in those states"). To capture this fact, the pool strength is measured by state. Moreover, the direct comparison approach accounted for geographic cost of living differences by assessing the relative costliness of the city where a specific judge lived. The pool comparisons are adjusted for geographic cost of living differences by averaging the geographic cost of living index statewide. working judiciary; and (3) paying circuit judges more creates a judiciary that is less concerned with its own influence. To test the three hypotheses, I used an econometric model to look for a statistical relationship between the amount of money a judge gave up to take the bench and the available measures of judicial performance.
A. Hypothesis One: Paying Circuit Judges More Creates a Less Ideological Judiciary
Measuring judicial ideology is a tricky business. The common perception is that some judges are conservative like, say, Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit, 76 while other judges are liberal like, say, Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit. 77 But what traits make Judge Jones conservative and Judge Reinhardt liberal? And, more to the point, can those traits be quantified? In short, testing whether judicial pay impacts judicial ideology requires some measure of ideology. This Article's analysis tackles ideology two different ways. The first subsection considers whether judicial pay impacts judicial voting in controversial cases. The operative assumption is that a more ideological judiciary will engage in more partisan voting patterns in these cases. A true conservative ideologue will always cast a conservative vote; the opposite holds for the liberal ideologue. By this measure, a more ideological judiciary consists of republican appointees who more routinely cast conservative votes and democratic appointees who more routinely cast liberal votes.
The second subsection examines the relationship between judicial pay and citation practices. Judges write opinions in addition to voting. These opinions often cite outside circuit judicial opinions to support their analysis. Because judges exercise substantial discretion as to when and what extra-circuit precedent they will cite, these citations can then be investigated for evidence of judicial ideology. 78 Choi & Gulati, Bias] (interpreting the finding that judges "cite judges of opposite political party less compared with the fraction of the total pool of opinions attributable to the opposite political party judges" to suggest that "judges base outside circuit citation decisions in part on the political party of the cited judge").
of judges who seldom, if ever, recognize the opinions of judges from the other political party as persuasive authority.
Voting Patterns in Controversial Cases
The Chicago Judge's Project provides data on judicial voting patterns in the circuit courts. 79 The project tracks circuit courts' recently published judicial decisions in controversial cases. The cases involve:
[A]bortion, capital punishment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, criminal appeals, takings, the Contracts Clause, affirmative action, Title VII race discrimination cases brought by African-American plaintiffs, sex discrimination, campaign finance, cases in which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil, industry challenges to environmental regulations, and federalism challenges to congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause. 80 The dataset includes 4958 decisions and 14,874 individual judicial votes. 81 Each judge's vote is coded "liberal" or "conservative." Although the labels are imprecise, they do track common notions of liberal and conservative jurisprudence. For example, a liberal vote in a sex discrimination case is a vote for the employee; a conservative vote is a vote for the employer. 82 To determine whether judicial pay impacts voting patterns, the analysis controls for other factors that might influence a judge's vote. One of the most important factors is the politics behind the judicial nomination process. 83 No matter the level of judicial pay, a republican president facing a republicancontrolled Senate will probably appoint a more conservative judge than will a democratic president facing a democratic-controlled Senate. 84 Just using an appointing president's political party as a proxy for an appointed judge's ideology, though, misses much of the nuance. Not all Republicans are equally (2001) (using a complex model of selection that focuses "on determining if the behavior of the judges once appointed is consistent with the operation in the selection process of" a partisan agenda reflecting the preference of state party elites, or a policy agenda reflecting the preference of the president, "and the influence of senatorial courtesy on either of these agendas"); Michael W. Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal developed measures of ideological preferences for members of Congress, conceptualizing all aspects of legislative voting in terms of a single ideological dimension (with a second dimension, such as civil rights, rising to greater importance during certain historical periods). Poole extended this approach to derive "common space" scores for members of Congress on a metric that is common across time, that is, a Senator's policy preference "common space" score is held constant across time and is the same for all periods. Subsequently, Poole extended this approach to derive common space scores for the policy preferences of Presidents since Eisenhower. nominee's ideological score equals the common space score of the appointing President. If there was senatorial courtesy for the nomination, the ideological score weights the common space scores of the President and the home state Senators.
Combining the data from the Chicago Judges Project with the Giles et al. measure reveals a consistency between the two datasets, demonstrated in Table  3 : Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Estimated coefficients reflect marginal effects when all the other independent variables are measured at their mean.
The dependent variable is the probability that the judge casts a liberal vote in a controversial case. The independent variables include the Giles et al. measure of the confirmation process ("selpref") and circuit dummy variables to control for differences across circuits. The Giles et al. measure is negative and highly statistically significant indicating, as predicted, that judges scoring higher (closer to 1), by the Giles measure, are less likely to cast a liberal vote. The more conservative the players in the nomination and confirmation process, the more likely the judge will be to cast a conservative vote in a controversial case.
I now turn to the hypothesis that higher judicial pay will lead to a less ideological judiciary. Tables 4 and 5 present the result of the direct comparison approach. I first divided the sample into votes by democratic appointees and votes by republican appointees. The dependent variable is the probability the judge casts a liberal vote in a controversial case. If the hypothesis is correct, the sign of the coefficient for the net cost variable ("NETCOST") should be positive and statistically significant for democratic appointees and negative and significant for republican appointees. As described in Section II, NETCOST measures the lump sum value of the lost lifetime earnings -that is, the financial sacrifice made. I measure NETCOST in $400,000 increments; that is to say, an increase in one unit of NETCOST represents an increase of $400,000 in spendable dollars. 88 For the lawyer living in the average city, $400,000 is, roughly, $50,000 additional dollars a year over 11 years, discounted at three percent.
Besides the Giles et al. measure, other controls included in the regression model are: (1) if available, the judge's net worth at the time of appointment, adjusted for inflation and geographic cost of living; 89 (2) circuit court dummy variables; (3) prior experience dummy variables, controlling for whether the judge came from private practice, academia, another judgeship, or other government service; 90 (4) the nominee's age at the time of appointment; (5) the nominee's gender; (6) whether the nominee came from a top-five legal market (New York, 91 Chicago, Los Angeles, 92 San Francisco, 93 or Washington D.C.); and (7) an interaction term between the top-five legal market and NETCOST variables.
Because this is the first of many regressions, a brief discussion of these control variables is in order. The net worth variable captures differences in wealth at the time of appointment. Because of the diminishing marginal utility of money, a salary hit of $1.5 million will cost a judge with accumulated 88 Spendable dollars is defined as extra dollars adjusted for geographic cost of living. For example, to give $400,000 spendable dollars to a judge from New York City, Congress would have to authorize a salary increase for that judge of more than $800,000 (i.e., $100,000 a year for eleven years, discounted at three percent). The reason is that New York City is more than twice as expensive as the average city in the United States. earnings of $5 million much less than it would cost a judge with accumulated earnings of $100,000. The net worth variable accounts for this fact. Unfortunately, net worth data are only available for 121 of the 259 judges in the sample.
The circuit court dummy variables control for unobserved differences in voting patterns across circuits due to, for example, the culture of the circuit. For example, no matter the value of NETCOST, judges from the Fifth Circuit might be more apt to cast a conservative vote than judges from the Ninth Circuit. 94 The prior experience dummy variables ("Judge," "Professor," and "Private Practice") capture differences in preferences associated with the candidate's prior work experience. If, say, a circuit court judge who comes directly from a job as a government lawyer is more partisan than one who comes from private practice, the coefficient on "Private Practice" should be statistically significant.
"Age" is included because judges appointed late in life might be less partisan than judges appointed early in life. Someone willing to take a judgeship at, say, age 35 might care more about policy outcomes than someone willing to take the job at, say, age 55. The 35 year-old will, after all, have a longer judicial career over which she can influence outcomes. 95 "Sex" controls for differences between the judicial performance of men and women. 96 The variable "Top Five Legal Market" controls for a potential error in the measurement of NETCOST. NETCOST assumes that candidates forgo the average salary of a comparable law firm partner in their region at the date of appointment. 97 Yet some appointees might give up more money than the average partner in the region, while other appointees might give up less. "Top Five Legal Market" captures this effect because law firm partners in the five major markets make significantly more money than law firm partners elsewhere. 98 The interaction term TOPFIVENETCOST allows for the increase in one unit of net cost to have a different effect on a judge from a major market than an increase in one unit of net cost on other judges in the region. For example, the judge from Chicago, coded as sacrificing $400,000, might really be giving up $800,000. Her taste for being a judge would therefore be larger than the NETCOST measure reflects. The implication is that this stronger 95 114 YALE L.J. 1759 114 YALE L.J. , 1776 114 YALE L.J. -79 (2005 (finding a higher probability of favorable judgments for plaintiffs in sexual discrimination cases when a female judge was involved in the case). 97 Of course, circuit judges might be above-average lawyers, not average lawyers. The average partner salary, then, might underestimate the true opportunity cost. If, as is plausible, the average salary for a law firm partner in a region highly correlates with the law firm salary for the above-average lawyer, the analysis still works. Because the variance in the average partnership salary tracks the variance in the salary for the above-average lawyer, the results remain the same. 98 Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Estimated coefficients reflect marginal effects when all the other independent variables are measured at their mean. Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Estimated coefficients reflect marginal effects when all the other independent variables are measured at their mean.
NETCOST is not statistically significant for either party in the entire sample, or the subsample for which net worth data are available. Table 6 presents the results of the pool comparison. The net cost variable ("NETCOSTPOOL"), again measured in $400,000 units, is not statistically significant for either democratic or republican appointees. Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Votes by DC Circuit judges not included; 11th circuit is the baseline group. Estimated coefficients reflect marginal effects when all the other independent variables are measured at their mean.
Both the analyses indicate that raising judicial salaries (i.e., lowering the net cost of taking the bench) would not impact judicial voting patterns in controversial cases. This empirical evidence suggests low pay does not lead to the appointment of more partisan judges, a finding consistent with the substitutes theory.
Citation Practices in Opinion Writing
Voting patterns are the most studied metric of judicial ideology. 99 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, however, recently looked at judicial ideology through a different lens -citations to persuasive authority. 100 Choi and Gulati collected data on judicial opinions rendered between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1999 , amassing data on the citation practices of ninety-eight circuit judges. 101 In particular, they examined who cites whom as persuasive authority. Choi and Gulati believe that the outside circuit citation practices can reveal a judge's ideology: a true ideologue would not be inclined to cite an opinion by a judge from a different political party. 102 For an ideologue, the reasoning of judges from the other political party is never persuasive.
Choi and Gulati found evidence of citation bias. Specifically, they found that judges tend to cite opinions from judges of the same political stripe, especially in "hot button" cases, such as civil rights and campaign finance. 103 They also found that dissent exacerbates bias. Dissenting judges and judges writing majority opinions in the face of dissent engage in more biased citation practices. 104 If presidents of opposing parties appointed the majority judges and the dissenting judge, the bias gets a further boost. 105 Choi and Gulati defined citation bias as follows: They first constructed the mean fraction of cites for a judge's opinions to outside circuit judges from the opposite political party. 106 If, for example, a judge cited to outside circuit judges of the same political stripe seventy-five percent of the time, the mean fraction of cites to judges of the opposite party would be twenty-five percent. Second, Choi and Gulati controlled for the pool of potentially citable opinions. 107 If most judges are republican-appointees, most outside circuit citations will be to republican-appointed judges. 108 In this case, the failure of a republican judge to cite democratic appointees would not indicate bias, but instead would merely reflect the lack of opinions in the citable pool authored by democratic appointees. To control for this, Choi and Gulati constructed a mean fraction of democratic-appointee and republican-appointee opinions in the pool. 109 Citation bias is the distance between the mean fraction of opposite party cites a judge makes and the mean fraction of republican opinions (for democrats) or democrat opinions (for republicans) in the pool. 110 The closer the distance is to zero, the less prevalent the citation bias. 111 If judges who give up lots of purchasing power are more ideological than judges who give up little purchasing power, low judicial salaries should increase citation bias. To test this hypothesis, I regressed the citation bias measure from the Choi and Gulati dataset against the same set of control variables used in the voting pattern regressions. Table 7 reports the results. 107 Choi & Gulati, Rankings, supra note 78, at 1294. 108 Choi & Gulati, Bias, supra note 78, at 16. 109 Id. at 18-19. 110 Id. at 20; see also Choi & Gulati, Rankings, supra note 78, at 1295. 111 Choi & Gulati, Rankings, supra note 78, at 1295. Model (1) Model (2) (Direct) Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The net cost measure is statistically insignificant in the direct and pool comparisons. The sample size is small here, limiting the power of the statistical test. With that caveat in mind, at least on this crude measure, there is little evidence that low judicial salaries result in a judiciary more prone to ideological thinking.
B. Hypothesis Two: Paying Circuit Judges More Creates a Harder Working Judiciary
Testing whether increased judicial pay would result in a harder working judiciary requires measuring the "work effort" of circuit judges. Actual effort is unobservable, however. I do not know how many hours each judge works, the number of weekends she takes off, etc. Instead, proxies are neededquantifiable measures of judicial output that correlate with judicial work effort. The next two subsections explore the relationship between judicial pay and two such proxies: (1) dissent rates in controversial cases; and (2) how long it takes a judge to file a published opinion after hearing oral argument in a controversial case.
encouraging the grant of certiorari. 115 Dissent can also influence the way the majority opinion is viewed by other circuit and district courts. 116 Finally, dissent can serve as a form of judicial self-expression. 117 Most of the benefits of dissent accrue to other judges in the circuit or people outside the judiciary. One might suspect that a judge inclined toward leisure would write fewer dissents, because the individual judge bears the cost of dissent and much of the benefits flow to others. Table 8 presents the dissent results. The Chicago Judge's Project provides the dependent variable: the probability a judge writes a dissent in a controversial case. 118 The independent variables are the same as in the previous regressions. In addition, I add a variable to control for the caseload in the circuit. To do this, for any given year, I use the number of cases determined on their merits in the circuit divided by the number of active judges in that circuit. 119 The thinking here is that higher caseloads might make dissent less likely to occur because dissent requires extra work, and judges with a high caseload might just not have the time. For the direct comparison approach, the coefficient on net cost (NETCOST) is statistically significant for the entire sample and for the subsample where net worth data are available. The coefficient on net cost in the pool comparison (NETCOSTPOOL) is not statistically significant. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient on NETCOST suggests poorly paid judges dissent slightly less often. The idea that higher judicial pay results in fewer leisureseeking judges and a slightly harder working judiciary overall supports the salary matters theory. But one should not overstate this result. Although the coefficient on NETCOST is statistically significant, its magnitude is tiny. Bumping federal judicial salaries up by $50,000 a year would increase the number of dissents by a little less than one percent in controversial cases.
The results from Table 8 should be interpreted with caution for another reason as well. The results are consistent with a judiciary composed of judges trying to find common ground. It is not just the lazy judge who writes fewer dissents, but also the more considerate judge. The dissent results support either story. Given this ambiguity, the following subsection takes another approach to estimating judicial work effort: considering whether judicial salaries impact the time it takes a judge to render a published decision.
Time it Takes To Render a Published Opinion in Controversial Cases
Judges vary as to the speed with which they dispose of cases. Rather than consider all cases, this subsection considers the speed of disposition of those controversial cases contained in the truncated Chicago Judge's Project dataset. This limitation serves three purposes.
First, these decisions involve controversial issues. A natural assumption is that judges care more about controversial cases and, as a result, are more likely to devote their own effort to resolve these cases. In other words, judges are unlikely to simply hand off a controversial case to their clerks without any supervision. 120 Second, the decisions are all published. Accordingly, judges are less likely to delegate these cases to staff attorneys. 121 REV. 273, 289 (1996) (stating that "law clerk influence is likely to be the greatest in less important cases, which are not argued and will not be published"). responsibility for case disposition. 122 After oral argument, slow case disposition is hard to pin on the actions of other court officials, such as the clerk of courts.
Immediately after oral argument, the senior active judge on a panel or the chief judge of the circuit makes opinion assignments for all cases argued that day. 123 The assigned judge is responsible for drafting and circulating the opinion. After the opinion is circulated, the other judges on the panel agree, draft a separate concurrence, or draft a dissent. Occasionally, judges will informally request changes to the majority opinion. 124 For each case in the truncated dataset, information on the date argued and date published was culled from Westlaw. Each case involved three-judge panels. The speed of disposition information was matched for a specific judge on a panel if that judge wrote the majority opinion, a separate concurrence, or a dissent. These judges do more than vote, and these "writing" activities might affect the speed of the decision. 122 For a discussion of the significant judicial responsibilities for opinion assignment and opinion writing which occur after oral argument, see id. at 6-8. 123 In the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits, the published internal court rules specify that the senior active judge on the panel makes the opinion assignment. COLUMBIA CIRCUIT § 12B (2007) . In the Fourth Circuit, the chief judge makes the assignment whether or not he or she served on the panel. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § 36.1 (2007) . In the First and Second Circuits, the internal rules do not specify opinion assignment procedures. Discussions with the clerks from these two circuits revealed that the senior active judge on the panel makes the opinion assignment after discussion with the other panel members. The dependent variable is speed of disposition. The independent variables include all the controls used in the prior regressions. In addition, I controlled for whether the judge writing the majority opinion faced either a concurring opinion or a dissent. The thinking is that those opinions might take longer to write as the writing judge responds to points raised in either the dissent or the concurrence. Table 9 reports the results. The net cost measure is not statistically significant in either the direct or pool comparisons. This finding suggests that low judicial pay does not change the speed of case disposition in controversial cases. 125 It is noteworthy that the dummy variable "Private Practice" is statistically significant, suggesting that those judges coming from private practice write opinions faster than those coming from positions as government lawyers. To the extent that low judicial salaries deter some private sector lawyers from joining the bench, one might expect low salaries to decrease the speed of disposition of cases. But even this effect is not terribly big. Lawyers directly from the private sector decide cases about a month and a half faster than government lawyers.
C. Hypothesis Three: Paying Circuit Judges More Creates a Judiciary Less Motivated by Its Own Influence
Outside circuit citations roughly capture judicial influence. Rules of precedent dictate inside circuit citations; that is to say, circuit precedent must be followed and cited. 126 By contrast, judges cite outside circuit opinions as persuasive authority to bolster arguments in their own opinions. 127 True, occasionally opinions criticize or distinguish an outside circuit opinion, but the need for such treatment still demonstrates the opinion's impact. After all, an opinion that is ignored is less influential than an opinion which a judge feels obliged to consider. 128 A judge who greatly valued her own influence would write more published opinions and try to ensure each opinion attracted more outside citations. The idea is that this judge -the influence maximizer -would write more opinions that "sell" in the opinion-citation market. Perhaps the influence maximizer would write shorter opinions, delegate less opinion writing to clerks, or spend more time ensuring the reasoning of opinions is sound and persuasive. In contrast to the judge who, say, valued leisure, the judge who valued influence would write more opinions and spend a lot of time on each one.
The salary matters theory predicts that low judicial pay leads to the appointment of judges who place a high value on judicial influence, and thus judges who gave up a lot of money to take the bench should be more influential than judges who gave up a little bit of money. As noted earlier, judges who make the biggest financial sacrifice probably have the greatest "taste" for judging. 129 One manifestation of a strong taste for judging is a need to be influential. To satisfy this need, influence-motivated judges might work hard to ensure they are cited.
To test this claim, I use citation data collected by William Landes, Larry Lessig, and Mike Solimine. 130 Landes et al. gathered data for 205 federal circuit judges on the bench in 1992 and looked at the number of outside circuit citations to the opinions authored by these judges. To measure impact, they considered two different models of outside circuit citation. 131 First, they constructed a model of total influence. 132 In this model, Landes et al. measured the raw number of citations to a judge's opinions and then controlled for, among other things, the length of judicial tenure (obviously a judge who has been around longer will have more citations). 133 The second modelaverage influence -measured the number of citations per opinion, controlling Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 54-58 (2004) (investigating whether the quality of opinions or the "outrageousness" of the judge contributes to a high citation count). Although not all of the problems with using citation counts for measuring academic influence transfer, some do. See Nancy Levit, Defining Cutting Edge Scholarship: Feminism and Criteria of Rationality, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 949-52 (1996) . For example, there could be outside circuit "citation clubs" -judges only citing other judges that cite them back. Furthermore, judicial citations might be more a matter of luck than judicial influence. Since cases are assigned randomly to panels, a judge's opinion might be cited frequently because that judge was the first to rule on an issue. With these caveats in mind, citations represent the best available measure of opinion quality and the most used quantitative metric to assess judicial influence. 129 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 130 Landes et al., supra note 127, at 276-79. 131 Id. at 280. 132 Id. 133 Id. The other controls include: (1) whether the judge was on senior status when the opinion issued; and, (2) dummy variables accounting for whether the opinion issued in the judge's first, second, or third years of the bench. for other factors. 134 A judge that scores well in average influence but low in total influence writes fewer opinions, but each one is a "gem." 135 The opposite is true for a judge that scores well in total influence and low in average influence. 136 This judge floods the market with opinions, each one garnering relatively modest outside attention. 137 Landes et al. then measured judicial influence in terms of citations, above what a judge's tenure, status, and other control variables predict. 138 For example, in terms of total influence, the estimated coefficient for Judge Posner is 4.41. 139 This coefficient means that Judge Posner's influence is a little less than four and a half percent higher than predicted by his tenure, status, and other controls. Tables 10 and 11 report the results of the total influence and average influence regressions respectively. 134 Landes et al., supra note 127, at 280. 135 Id. at 280-81. 136 Id. at 281. 137 Id. 138 Id. at 284-302. 139 Id. at 288, tbl. 2A. If low salaries result in a judiciary composed of more people who highly value their own judicial influence, the coefficient on financial sacrifice should be positive and significant. In both the total influence regression and the average influence regression the coefficients on "NETCOST" and "NETCOSTPOOL" are just barely insignificant. The take away is that the citation data are consistent with the substitutes theory: lowering the financial sacrifice judges must make would not change opinion quality all that much. True, the effects here border on statistically significant, but the estimated coefficients are nonetheless tiny. The best prediction is that increasing judicial pay by $50,000 a year for eleven years would decrease opinion quality by between three and five percent.
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
This last section deals with potential objections to the analysis. The first set of objections has to do with the data. As noted earlier, the opportunity cost measure is imprecise. 140 One weakness is that the measure does not capture the fact that some judges would have made better law firm partners than others. That said, the data source used, the Survey of Law Firm Economics, provides the most comprehensive overview of the national law firm market. 141 The survey has been published over a longer period of time than any other law firm salary database. 142 Thus, it provides the best source for comparable law firm partner salaries. 143 The second data objection is that all the analysis really captures are regional differences in law firm salaries and differences across the appointees' age at the time of appointment. After all, older candidates give up less money and candidates across circuits give up different amounts of money. Under this objection, the NETCOST measure is not really judge-specific in any sense other than region and age; the variation in salary that drives the analysis is really just variation across circuits and the appointees' ages at appointment. NETCOST does not provide additional information that is not already available in the circuit dummy variables and the age variable. True, NETCOST, age, and the circuit dummies are highly correlated. This "multicollinearity" increases the standard errors, which might then generate the insignificant results. This is a serious objection, but not decisive.
Age and circuit specific effects explain about sixty percent of the variance in NETCOST, leaving additional explanatory value to the NETCOST measure. Second, multicollinearity leads to large standard errors, which increases the confidence intervals. There is no reason, however, to suspect that the NETCOST coefficient is a biased estimate. More importantly, even if the true effects of higher salaries rest at the extreme ends of the confidence intervals, 140 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 141 See supra note 53. 142 The American Lawyer first published the AmLaw 100 in 1993 and the AmLaw 200 in 1999. The National Association for Law Placement (NALP) is the other common source of law firm salary information. While more geographically comprehensive than the American Lawyer Series, the NALP data suffers a different flaw: NALP reports first year associate salaries only. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2006 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2006 . Obviously, a comparison to first-year associate salaries would understate the opportunity cost for a seasoned lawyer deciding to take the federal bench. 143 The AmLaw 100 and the Am Law 200 report salaries from the prominent national firms only. For some judges like, say, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, partner salary in a prominent firm is a closer measure of his true opportunity cost. While perhaps getting a clearer picture of Judge Easterbrook's lost earnings, the Am Law 100 and Am Law 200 present significant other problems. Unlike the Law Firm Survey, the Am Law 100 and Am Law 200 do not report anticipated increases in compensation due to increased seniority in the firm, an important part of the net cost calculation. Second, the Am Law 100 and Am Law 200 do not provide information for many of the judges on the federal bench. the effects are nonetheless practically trivial for most measures of judicial performance.
Another related data objection is this: if some people who give up a lot of money are motivated by the power to affect policy, others motivated by influence, others motivated by a desire for leisure, and still others motivated by a call to public service, each of these people will perform differently on the various measures of judicial performance. As a result, the statistical tests will contain a lot of noise. The policy-motivated judge who cares little about her influence will vote her policy preferences, but will not invest energy in writing opinions that other judges will cite. The leisure-maximizing judge will seldom vote her policy preferences, but will always take a long time to write her opinions. The influence-motivated judge will write well-cited opinions, but will not always vote strictly along party lines. Because there are many reasons a person might forgo income to become a judge, the statistical tests cannot tease out any single "true" motivation. This results in a failure to find a statistical relationship between financial sacrifice and judicial performance.
This objection is not serious, given the purpose of the analysis. Basically, the objection says that the findings are consonant with low judicial salaries attracting a hodgepodge of folks with different motivations. These people will perform differently along various metrics of judicial performance and those different performances will largely cancel each other out. That is fair enough. The end result is the same: no link between judicial salaries and judicial performance, and little empirical support for raising judicial salaries.
The next objection involves errors in the measurement of judicial performance. The analysis focuses on the "measurables" -voting patterns, citation counts, dissents, time to decision, etc. It does not immediately follow from the finding that the "measurables" would not change much that the judiciary would not look different with higher salaries. There are not data on everything that goes into judicial performance. And even the output that is measured correlates only imperfectly with the "true" judicial product. Moreover, many non-measured attributes that go into making a good judge might be influenced by higher salaries. Higher salaries might, for example, attract those committed to the judiciary as an institution -people just trying to do a good job without baser motives. The analysis says nothing about possibilities like this.
One final set of objections involves some other potential costs of low judicial salaries. Allowing judicial salaries to lag significantly behind private sector salaries might signal that a circuit judge is less valuable than a run-ofthe-mill lawyer. The weak signal could then impact how the public feels about the judiciary. Alternatively, judges might be demoralized because they make less than judicial clerks do in their first year after leaving a judge's chambers. Under this concern, relative pay is what matters to the judge, not absolute pay. With low relative pay, judges feel undervalued and, as a result, do a worse job. 144 These final two objections are valid. I do not test for them, but that does not mean they are unimportant.
With respect to federal circuit court judges, the analysis is the best that can be done with the available data. The statistical analysis hunts for a "constitutional crisis," for some impact of judicial salaries on judicial performance. It measures the impact of judicial salaries by two methodspool comparisons and direct comparisons -taking both methods to a wide variety of judicial output measures. Yet despite this hunt, these data show judicial salaries have a minimal impact on judicial performance. This Article shifts the burden to the advocates for higher judicial pay. The advocates need to show that the impact on softer variables and concerns outweighs the tiny effect of higher judicial salaries on measurable aspects of judicial performance.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts, his brethren, and many prominent members of the legal community have issued statements about the corrosive effect of low judicial salaries. The heated rhetoric is itself telling: low judicial salaries are creating a "constitutional crisis"; 145 because of low salaries "the nation is in danger of having a judiciary that is no longer considered one of the leading judiciaries of the world"; 146 and "eroding federal judicial salaries will lead, sooner or later, to less capable judges and ultimately to inferior adjudication." 147 This Article is the first to test whether judicial salaries really do impact judicial performance. Given the available data, the effect of low judicial pay is non-existent, at least when judicial pay is measured against the next best financial opportunity for most circuit judges. Low pay does not impact voting patterns, citation practices, the speed of controversial case disposition, or opinion quality. Low pay does lead to slightly fewer dissents. While statistically significant, the magnitude of this effect is slight.
Low judicial salaries might have a corrosive character. The source of the corrosion, however, rests outside judicial performance. Chief Justice Roberts is probably half right: low judicial salaries erect a barrier to entry onto the bench for some candidates. But this barrier is inconsequential if those candidates who are willing to take judgeships are indistinguishable from those candidates driven from the applicant pool by low judicial salaries. That is the story these data support.
